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PUBLIC LAW
an extrinsic source for ascertaining the basic purpose and nature
of the statute. Louisiana, as is the case in most states, does not
have a legislative record of the committee hearings and floor
debates, and so our courts must rely heavily on artificial canons
of construction, such as the doctrines of expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius, ejusdem generis, and noscitur a sociis. These
maxims are merely guides to interpretation, giving way to the
overriding general legislative purpose if such purpose can be
ascertained. 25 Sometimes the general legislative purpose is ascer-
tainable from the title of the act or a policy section. More often,
such guides to statutory interpretation are unavailable or are
very inadequate. The Council Digests in Louisiana will not pro-
vide the sponsor's version of the law, often available from the
congressional records as to federal statutes.26 However, they
should be entitled to considerable weight in ascertaining the
nebulous "legislative intent," which is the composite purpose of
the committees that reported the bill favorably and of the legis-
lative body that gave it vitality by final passage. The Legislative
Council Digests were considered by these groups and may rea-
sonably be presumed to represent their understanding as to the
general nature and scope of the enactment. The availability of
this interpretative material, and its weight, may well depend
upon whether an official depository of these digests is available,
either in the Office of the Secretary of State or of the Legisla-
tive Council itself.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT- ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Alvin B. Rubin*
ZONING
An attack upon the validity of an application of the New
Orleans zoning ordinance was made in New Orleans v. La Nasa.1
25. City of Shreveport v. Price, 142 La. 936, 77 So. 883 (1918), refusing to
apply the doctrine of expresaio uniu8; Boardman v. State, 203 Wis. 173, 233 N.W.
556 (1930), holding that these maxims of construction "are servants, rather than
masters, of the court."
26. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951)
where the Court looked to the statements of the bill's sponsor, Senator Tydings,
as to the purpose of the Miller-Tydings amendment to the Sherman Act.
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar, Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana
State University.
1. 230 La. 289, 88 So.2d 224 (1956).
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A property owner complained that the front portion of his prop-
erty, on Gentilly Boulevard, was zoned residential while the rear
portion, twenty feet in width, was zoned for industrial use. The
property owner urged that such an application of the ordinance
was unconstitutional and that it was invalid as unreasonable.
The court applied the settled principle that zoning "does not
violate any constitutional guarantee unless it is found to be
palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.' 2 That left for considera-
tion only the contention "that the zoning of the property was
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the com-
munity."
In accordance with the rule which has universally been ap-
plied in other states," the court held that the burden of proving
the ordinance unreasonable rested upon the plaintiffs. This bur-
den was not sustained by showing that the city had not adopted
all of the recommendations of a survey made by a firm of mu-
nicipal planning experts. The court felt that the evidence clearly
showed that "prodigious study and comprehensive planning"
went into preparation of the ordinance.
The court distinguished a case in which it has held an ap-
plication of the Baton Rouge zoning ordinance invalid, State
ex rel. Loraine, Inc. v. Adjustment Board of the City of Baton
Rouge.4 The grounds of distinction are important. The court
stated that in the Loraine case, "the area zoned residential was
unzoned before its acquisition and the landowner was led to be-
lieve that the property would be classified commercial, both by
letter from the planning engineer of the City Planning Commis-
sion and by a zoning map prepared by the Commission." The
court did not agree with the defendants' contention that the
rear portion of the property was in fact zoned industrial but
held that, even if it were, "defendants would have no cause for
complaint." They "can hardly be heard to say that the zoning
is unreasonable because the rear 20 feet of their lots is zoned
for a less restrictive (and more profitable) use."
If the Loraine decision is to be applied so narrowly as the
consideration of it in the La Nasa case indicates, zoning com-
2. 88 So.2d at 226.
8. See 1 ANTIAu, MuNIciPAL CORPORATION LAW 420 (1955)..
4. 220 La. 708, 57 So.2d 409 (1952).
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missions have more latitude in classifying property than indi-
cated by some of the general statements made in the opinion in
the Loraine case.
PUBLIC PROPERTY
The dedication of property to a public use, is, in effect,
irrevocable.5 Only the Legislature may alter or terminate the
dedication. These principles formed the basis of the problem
presented in New Orleans v. Louisiana Society for Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals.6 The city had agreed to sell property
known as "Commerce Place" to the society. The society refused
to accept title on the grounds that the city had not acquired
title or, if it had, that the property was acquired for public use
and therefore could not be disposed of for private use without
an express legislative grant of authority. The city sought spe-
cific performance of the agreement.
The court concluded from the evidence that title to the public
square became vested in the City of New Orleans "as public
property by dedication in 1836." The city sought to find legis-
lative authority to dispose of the property in a provision of the
New Orleans City Charter,7 which provided in part that "the
Commission Council shall also have power . . .by a two-thirds
vote to sell or change the designation of any street, side-walk
or other property which is no longer necessary for the public
use to which it was originally destined."
The court held that this "general authority" is "not such an
express and specific authorization as required by our codal ar-
ticles and jurisprudence to alienate property designated and
treated as locus publicus." Justice McCaleb dissented on this
point, feeling the decision to be in conflict with prior decisions.8
Justice Hawthorne concurred in the decree on the basis of a
5. See Shreveport v. Walpole, 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870), and other Louisiana
cases cited in opinion. See also Lowell v. Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 79 N.E.2d 713
(1948) ; 1 ANTIAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW 527 (1955).
6. 229 La. 246, 85 So.2d 503 (1956).
7. La. Acts 1912, § 8(1), as amended, La. Acts 1948, No. 378. See also LA.
CONST. art. XIV, § 22, as amended, La. Acts 1950, No. 551.
8. Citing State ex rel. Ruddock Orleans Cypress Co. v. Knop, 147 La. 1057,
86 So. 493 (1920) (involving exchange of street right of way for other property) ;
Schernbeck v. New Orleans, 154 La. 676, 98 So. 84 (1923) (involving sale of
property found by city council to be needed no longer for a street) ; State em rel.
Porterie v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 190 La. 710, 182 So. 725 (1938)
(involving closing streets in connection with creation of the Housing Authority
of New Orleans).
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further provision in the New Orleans City Charter which quali-
fied the power quoted above by adding: "provided that no desig-
nation of any property as a public park or public square.., shall
be changed without the approval in writing of seventy per cent
(70%) of the property owners within a radius of three hundred
(300) feet ,of such property." A rehearing was applied for
and amicus curiae briefs were filed by the Committee on Title
Examination of the New Orleans Bar Association and by the
Cities of Alexandria, Baton Rouge, and Monroe, urging that
the original decision left the validity of many titles in doubt.
In its opinion on rehearing, the court found that the provi-
sions of the city charter were sufficient to amount to "express
authority" granted the city by the Legislature to change the
designation of the property. 9 But the court concluded that
"Commerce Place" was a public square and hence that consent
of the neighboring owners was required by the applicable pro-
visions of the New Orleans Charter before it could be sold. Jus-
tice McCaleb dissented on the ground that there was nothing
in the record which defined Commerce Place as a public square
and he did not believe it to be a square within the meaning of
the city charter. Justice Hawthorne concurred in part and dis-
sented in part, stated that he agreed with the principles set
forth by the' court but that he was "unable to conclude from the
record that 'Place du Commerce' was and is in fact a public park
or public square." He suggested that the cause should be re-
manded for further proceedings concerning that question.
ADJUDICATION OF TAX PROPERTY
In a companion case 10 to an earlier decision1' the court af-
firmed its decision that a suit to compel a city to issue a deed
for property adjudicated at public auction must allege that the
adjudication took place under the procedure prescribed by R.S.
47:2191 which deals specifically with the sale of property ad-
judicated to the City of New Orleans. No cause of action was
stated because the plaintiff failed to allege adjudication under
that act and alleged instead that the auction was held pursuant
to R.S. 33:2861, which deals with adjudications of property
9. 229 La. 246, 270, 85 So.2d 503, 511 (1956).
10. Warren Realty Co. v. Sibley, 229 La. 456, 86 So.2d 101 (1956).
11. State ex rel. Warren Realty Co. v. New Orleans, 226 La. 297, 76 So.2d
308 (1954.)
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belonging to municipalities generally. The court had previously
held the general provisions inapplicable to the City of New Or-
leans because of the special statute providing for procedure
there.
SEWERAGE MAINTENANCE TAX
In Grein v. First Sewerage District of the City of Lake
Charles,12 the court held that the five mill tax limit on special
purpose taxes contained in Article X, Section 10, of the Lou-
isiana Constitution of 1921 superseded earlier statutory au-
thority limiting to one mill the maintenance tax which could
be imposed by a sewerage district. The court relied upon the
statement in the Constitution that "this section shall be self-
operative." The decision's broader application is indicated by
the court's statement that "the provisions of R.S. 33:3937 can-
not limit the amount of taxes which Article X, Section 10,
authorizes the governing authority to impose." In addition, the
court here applied the previously settled rule that taxes imposed
by virtue of authority contained in other sections of the Con-
stitution are not to be included in computing the overriding
twenty-five mill maximum set by Section 10 of Article X for
taxes authorized by that section notwithstanding that, under
other constitutional provisions, taxes may be levied for exactly
the same purposes as those for which they are permitted by Sec-
tion 10 of Article X.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The court was relatively untroubled by questions of admin-
istrative law and procedure at this term. The one point raised
involved the legality of action taken by the Liquefied Petroleum
Commission in organizing itself and conducting Commission
business at a time when two of the five members of the Com-
mission provided by the Constitution had not yet been ap-
pointed. 18 However, the Constitution does provide that a ma-
jority of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the trans-
action of all business; hence three members could lawfully act
as a Commission. The court interpreted this provision as con-
taining adequate authority for the three existing members to
meet and organize as a preliminary to transacting the business
12. 230 La. 187, 88 So.2d 21 (1956).
13. Liquefied Petroleum Gas Commission v. E. R. Kiper Gas Corp., 229 La.
640, 86 So.2d 518 (1956).
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of the Commission. The wisdom of the decision is demonstrated
when one reflects upon the delaying tactics possible if a full
board was deemed necessary for organization and where, as
here, two members were to be nominated by the industry and
appointed by the Governor: the possibility of delay is present
even though, failing industry nomination, the Governor has the
power to appoint since there must presumably be at least an
attempt to obtain nominations before such appointments.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Charles A. Reynard*
Four of the cases decided during the past term were con-
cerned with varying aspects of state and local taxation.
The most significant of these cases by far was Fontenot v.
John I. Hay Company,' a summary proceeding by the State Col-
lector of Revenue to collect income taxes on that portion of the
taxpayer's net income attributable to business performed in
Louisiana. The taxpayer, a Delaware corporation, licensed to do
business in Delaware and Illinois, but not in Louisiana, operated
as a commonlcarrier by water, transporting cargoes over the
Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee Rivers, as well as the Intra-
coastal Waterway through Louisiana and Texas. Although it
maintained an office and employed persons in Louisiana, the
taxpayer did no intrastate business in the state. Its activities
here consisted of transporting cargoes through the state, deliver-
ing cargoes here that originated outside the state or picking up
cargoes in Louisiana for out of state delivery. The Collector
sought payment of income taxes on that portion of the corpora-
tion's net income apportioned to Louisiana in accordance with
the formula prescribed by the act. The taxpayer conceded that
the apportionment was correct, but contended that Louisiana had
no constitutional authority to impose its tax because of the limi-
tations of the commerce clause in the Federal Constitution.
The litigation came as no surprise, since a number of foreign
corporations in comparable situations had been asserting im-
munity to state taxation of apportioned net income since the 1951
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Spector Motor
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 1031, 84 So.2d 810 (1955).
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